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ABSTRACT 
In this paper, we investigate the glass ceiling hypothesis according to which there exists larger gender 
wage gaps at the upper tail of the wage distribution. We demonstrate that in some circumstances, more 
qualified women may be offered lower wages than men at the equilibrium. This occurs for instance in 
a competitive model of wage determination where employers face gender-specific probabilities 
concerning the stability of their employees in their firms. Then, we focus on the relevance and the 
magnitude of the glass ceiling effect in France using a representative matched worker-firm data set in 
1992 of about 130,000 employees and 14,000 employers. We estimate quantile regressions and use a 
principal component analysis to summarize information specific to the firms. Our different results 
show that accounting for firm-related characteristics, in particular firm-specific wage policies, reduces 
the gender earnings gap at the top of the distribution, but the latter still remains much higher at the top 
than at the bottom. 
Key Words : Gender wage gap; Glass ceiling; Quantile regressions; Matched worker-firm data. 
RESUME 
Nous analysons l’existence du phénomène de “plafond de verre” selon lequel il existerait des écarts 
salariaux selon le genre plus importants dans le haut de la distribution des revenus. Nous montrons 
dans un modèle compétitif de détermination des salaires que, sous certaines hypothèses et à 
l’équilibre, les femmes les plus qualifiées reçoivent des salaires plus faibles que ceux des hommes de 
même niveau de qualification. Cela se produit si les employeurs apprécient différemment selon le sexe 
des employés la stabilité des travailleurs dans leur entreprise. Nous examinons ensuite la pertinence de 
cette hypothèse et l’étendue de l’effet de plafond de verre à l’aide de données représentatives de 
l’industrie privée française en 1992 liant quelque 130.000 employés à plus de 14.000 établissements. 
Nous estimons des régressions de quantiles et utilisons une analyse factorielle pour résumer les 
informations spécifiques à chaque établissement. Nos différents résultats montrent que prendre en 
compte les caractéristiques des établissements, en particulier leur politique salariale spécifique, réduit 
l’estimation de l’écart de revenus entre sexes en haut de la distribution, mais celui-ci n’en demeure pas 
moins beaucoup plus important en haut qu’en bas de cette distribution des revenus. 
Mots clefs: Écart salarial selon le genre; Plafond de verre; Régressions de quantiles; Données 
appariées employeurs-employés 
JEL Code : J16, J31, D80 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The persistence of wage differentials between men and women with identical productive 
characteristics is an important stylised fact of labour markets in both industrialised and developing 
countries. Evidence of a gender wage gap in pay is indeed abundant. Wage differentials across genders 
that are not compensated by observed socio-economic characteristics were found on numerous 
occasions in empirical studies (see for instance the review in Blau and Kahn, 2000). Many models 
have attempted to give a theoretical interpretation to these gender pay gaps. Traditionally, economists 
have focused on either qualifications or labour market treatment of similarly qualified individuals2. 
Other theories like the insider-outsider or the efficiency wage models have stressed non-competitive 
mechanisms of wage determination. 
More recently, it has been suggested that there exists larger gender wage gaps at the upper tail of the 
wage distribution, so that it concerns in most cases the more skilled workers. This is the so-called 
glass ceiling effect above women in the labour market, which can be defined as an invisible barrier 
that inhibits promotion opportunities for women, but not for men, and prevents them from reaching 
top positions. Several papers have empirically shed light on the magnitude of the glass ceiling effect in 
different European countries. 
For instance, using data collected in 1998 in Sweden, Albrecht et alii (2003) show that the gender 
wage gap is increasing throughout the conditional wage distribution and accelerating at the top, and 
they interpret this result as evidence of a glass ceiling in Sweden. Using data for Spain, De la Rica et 
alii (2005) stratify their sample by education group and find that the gender wage gap is expanding 
over the wage distribution only for the group with tertiary education. For less educated groups, the 
gender wage gap is wider at the bottom than the top. This means that, in Spain, there is a glass ceiling 
for the more educated, while for the less educated there is not. 
Using the European Community Household Panel data set, Arulampalam et alii (2004) find that for 
most of their ten EU countries, in both the public and private sectors, the average gender wage gap can 
be broken up into a gap that is typically wider at the top and occasionally also wider at the bottom of 
the conditional wage distribution. They interpret the gender wage gap at the top of the wage 
distribution as a glass ceiling evidence, whereby women otherwise identical to men can only advance 
so far up the pay ladder. At the bottom of the wage distribution in some of their EU countries, they 
also find that the gender pay gap widens significantly and define this phenomenon as a sticky floor 
(see also Booth et alii, 2003, Ichino and Filippin, 2005). 
To date, there is no clear theoretical argument to rationalize the glass ceiling effect among the various 
usual explanations which have been suggested for the gender wage gap. According to the beckerian 
theory, discrimination is due to the discriminatory tastes of employers, co-workers, or customers. 
Alternatively, in models of statistical discrimination, differences in the treatment of men and women 
arise from average differences between the two groups in the expected value of productivity or in the 
reliability with which productivity may be predicted, which leads employers to discriminate on the 
basis of that average. Discriminatory exclusion of women from ‘male’ jobs can also result in an excess 
supply of labour in ‘female’ occupations, depressing wages there for otherwise equally productive 
workers. But in these various approaches, there is no reason to expect larger gaps at the upper tail of 
the wage distribution. 
De la Rica et alii (2005) provide an interesting formal analysis in order to rationalize the glass ceiling 
hypothesis3. They suggest that a dead-end argument operate in the upper tail of the distribution. 
                                                     
2 The former, within the competitive framework, emphasize the existence of compensating wages due, for instance, to differences in 
human capital accumulation across gender. Because women anticipate shorter and more discontinuous work lives, they have lower 
incentives to invest in market-oriented formal education and on-the-job training, and their resulting smaller human capital investments 
will lower their earnings relative to those of men.  
3 At the same time, to rationalize the glass floor observed in Spain for low-educated women, De la Rica et alii (2005) suggest that 
employers may use statistical discrimination amongst women. But as the job tenure of women expands, women become more reliable 
and then the female wage is expected to converge to the male wage. 
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Women are less frequently promoted because their jobs can less easily be promoted4. Employers are 
most often reluctant to invest in women’s training, for instance because women have more favourable 
outside opportunities than men within the household (for domestic work or child care), which again 
increases the gender wage gap. Therefore, women have to be more productive than men in order to be 
promoted owing to a higher probability of departure and less training. 
Our purpose in this paper is to further investigate the glass ceiling hypothesis, both from a theoretical 
and empirical viewpoint. Our contribution is twofold. On the one hand, we consider a competitive 
model of wage determination with uncertainty on the women’s productivity and show that more 
qualified women are offered lower wages at the competitive equilibrium. On the other hand, we test 
the relevance of the glass ceiling effect using matched employer-employee data. Indeed, the gender 
wage gap at the upper tail of the wage distribution may be wrongly overstated if firms reward highly 
educated women differently than men. 
We first present a model of gender discrimination at the firm level, which predicts the competitive 
wage structure within firms. The key assumption is that employers account for conjectures about the 
future stability of both their male and female workers, but the probability to stay within the firm 
differs between men and women. While employers admit that male and female workers have an equal 
productivity, they attach more uncertainty to the women’s careers. This is the case if they face greater 
incertitude towards females’ employment duration over time, for instance as a result of their more 
discontinuous work participation (owing to family events or societal discrimination in domestic tasks). 
In this setting, we demonstrate that firms are expected to offer lower wages to women as a result of the 
uncertainty regarding the long-term stability of their female employees. Indeed, firms pass the risk of 
variability in women’s production on female wages and the negative risk premium increases as women 
are more qualified. 
Then, we provide empirical evidence on the gender wage gap in France. One popular way to account 
for firms and workers’ characteristics, including their human capital features, is to base the empirical 
analysis on matched worker-firm data (see Abowd and Kramarz, 1999). Although differences in 
productivity across workers could stem from their differences in human capital, it is well 
acknowledged that some skills or human capital attributed to workers are also specific to the firms in 
which those workers operate. Thus, part of the returns to human capital for the worker remuneration 
can be viewed as originating from the firm (human capital externalities)5. This means that not 
controlling for firm specific effects on individual earnings differentials may lead researchers to bias 
their estimates of the different returns to human capital. But curiously, firm specific effects are most 
often neglected in the analysis of gender earnings gap, Meng (2004) being a recent and worthwhile 
exception. 
In our paper, we shall avail ourselves of such data by using French worker-firm matched data. To the 
best of our knowledge, our paper is the first on the glass ceiling effect to control for these specific firm 
effects. Following previous studies, we first use quantile regressions techniques to assess the existence 
and the extent to which the glass ceiling phenomenon exists in France. Then, we control for firms’ 
specific wage policies by introducing the firms’ features into the different earnings functions. A 
novelty of our approach is to perform quantile regressions using a preliminary principal component 
analysis of firms’ characteristics, as in Muller and Nordman (2004, 2005). According to the French 
data, we show that introducing firms-related characteristics into earnings equation significantly 
reduces the gender earnings gap at the top of the distribution. Nevertheless, the gender wage gap still 
remains greater at the top than at the bottom. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe a competitive model of 
wage determination with uncertainty on female productivity. The French data that we use for the 
empirical analysis is described in Section 3. In Section 4, we present the econometric methodology 
                                                     
4 Conversely, since high-educated women have participation rates which are only slightly lower than male participation rates, women’s 
and men’s wages should not be very different in the lower part of the income distribution (De la Rica et al., 2005). 
5 It is also possible that part of what could be interpreted as human capital externalities in the estimates is in fact a consequence of the 
selection of workers by firms and vice versa. For instance, highly educated workers (i.e. high wage workers) are more likely to match 
with high wage firms (Abowd et alii, 1999). 
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and our strategy to account for firm related characteristics. We discuss in section 5 the different results 
of the quantile regressions. Finally, Section 6 concludes. 
2. A COMPETITIVE MODEL OF WAGE DETERMINATION WITH UNCERTAINTY 
Despite of the impressive literature on the theoretical foundations of the gender wage gap, it remains 
difficult to understand how the gap evolves throughout the distribution of wages. As suggested in De 
la Rica et alii (2005), several explanations may be invoked to rationalize the glass ceiling effect. We 
believe that basic, albeit realistic, assumptions are sufficient to explain why the gender wage gap is 
higher at the top of the wage distribution. Specifically, we focus on the consequences of the fact that 
women are more likely to quit their job than men. So, our aim in this theoretical section is not to 
propose a structural model to be tested, but instead to better understand the role of factors that can 
affect the shape of the gender wage profile. 
Let us consider a representative firm which produces a good tY  at date t . This good is sold on a 
competitive market and it is treated as the numeraire ( 1=p ). To produce that good, the firm hires two 
types of workers, men and women. We denote respectively by 1h  and 2h  the levels of human capital 
for a man and for a woman. We have either 21 hh ≠  or 21 hh = , meaning that there may exist gender 
differences in the level of human capital. For the sake of simplicity, there is no on-the-job training in 
our model and the level of human capital remains constant over time for each employee. Let 1n  and 
2n  be respectively the numbers of men and women who are currently working in the representative 
firm. 
We consider that the firm does not really know how long a worker will stay in the firm. This does not 
seem unrealistic a priori. Assuming that the expected duration of a job in a specific firm is given by 
)( 1TE  and )( 2TE  respectively for a man and a woman, then )(/1 11 TEq =  and )(/1 22 TEq =  are 
the probabilities respectively for a man and for a woman to quit their current job. We make the 
following assumption concerning 1q  and 2q . 
Assumption 1. The probability to quit a job is higher for a woman, i.e. 12 qq > . 
So, we suppose that employers believe that on average, women are characterized by higher quit rates. 
To justify that crucial assumption, one can rely on gender differences in the labour force participation. 
For instance, it is well known that women are less likely to have a paid job than men and that they 
most often interrupt their formal activities. This may occur because of births or other family events, 
women being more likely to care for their elderly parents or to spend time educating their children. 
Owing to these more frequent interruptions, we argue that the firm suffers from a higher uncertainty 
when evaluating the long-term productivity of their female workers with respect to the male workers. 
To formalize this uncertainty, we introduce into the definition of the level of employment a random 
term on the female productivity. As a consequence, the quantity of efficient labour is itself a random 
variable denoted by tN~ , which is given by the following sum: 
ttt nhnhN 2211 ~
~ ε+=  (1) 
where tnh 11  and 
tnh 22~ε  are respectively the male and female levels of employment. Importantly, we 
do not assume that the mean level of productivity is different for male and female workers. We just 
suppose that there is more uncertainty on the female labour force participation. As a consequence, the 
term ε~  may be described by a random variable whose mean is 1)~( =εE  and 2)~( εσε =Var . To find 
a more explicit result and in order to get closed-form solutions for our problem, we make the 
following assumption concerning the female productivity parameter. 
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Assumption 2. The parameter ε~  follows a Normal distribution ),1( 2εσN . 
Without loss of generality, we neglect the role of the capital factor in the production process6. The 
production function for the representative firm may be expressed as: 
)~(~ 2211
ttt nhnhFY ε+=  (2) 
where the function (.)F  is continuous and characterized by decreasing returns, i.e. 0(.)' >F  and 
0(.)'' <F . In the above production function, we note that female and male labour force participations 
are two perfectly substitutable inputs. 
Given the possibility of quitting the firm, we account for turnover costs in the model. Let tl1  and 
tl2  be 
the numbers of men and women who are hired each year by the firm, and we denote by )( 11
tt lc  and 
)( 22
tt lc  the corresponding hiring cost functions. As might be expected, we consider that hiring more 
qualified workers is more costly for the firm and we express these turnover costs as a linear function 
of the number of hiring. Hence, we have ttt lhclc 1111 )()( =  and ttt lhclc 2222 )()( = , with 0(.)' >c  and 
0(.)'' <c . Finally, as there are entry and exit of workers in our setting, the following equations fully 
characterize the dynamics of employment within the representative firm respectively for men and 
women: 
tt
t
nql
dt
dn
111
1 −=  (3) 
tt
t
nql
dt
dn
222
2 −=  (4) 
meaning that at date t , the total level of employment either for men or women is given by the number 
of employees at date 1−t  plus the difference between the number of hiring workers and the number 
of voluntary exits between 1−t  and t . 
Finally, we define the profit function for the firm at date t . The two variables of interest for our 
problem are the levels of wage for men and women, respectively denoted by 1w  and 2w . Workers are 
remunerated at their marginal productivity, so that the firm’s expected profit tEΠ~  (given the 
randomness of the female productivity) is simply: 
ttttttt lhclhcnwnwnhnhFEE 221122112211 )()()]~([
~ −−−−+=Π ε  (5) 
So, the problem for the firm is to maximize its expected profit discounted at the interest rate r subject 
to the constraints which characterize the dynamics of employment over time. The corresponding 
program may be expressed as: 
{ }
⎪⎩
⎪⎨⎧ −=
−=
−−−−+∫
+ℜ
−
ttt
ttt
rttttttt
ll
nqldtdn
nqldtdn
ts
dtelhclhcnwnwnhnhFE
tt
2222
1111
221122112211
,
/
/
..
)()()]~([max
21
ε
 (6) 
                                                     
6 In so doing, we rely on the argument developed in Nickell (1986). When firms plan campaigns of hiring, decisions related to capital 
investments have most often already been made and thus capital may be seen as pre-determined. 
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The optimal wage policy may easily be found by solving this problem of optimal control. Let us define 
the current value of the Hamiltonian H  such that: 
)()(
)()()]~([
22221111
221122112211
nqlnql
lhclhcnwnwnhnhFEH
−+−+
−−−−+=
λλ
ε
 (7) 
where 1λ  and 2λ  are the co-state variables associated respectively to the constraints on the levels of 
employment 1n  and 2n . The conditions of optimality for this problem are 0/ 1 =∂∂ lH , 
0/ 2 =∂∂ lH , 111 // nHrdtd ∂∂−= λλ  and 222 // nHrdtd ∂∂−= λλ . Hence, we get: 
0)( 11 =+− λhc  (8) 
0)( 22 =+− λhc  (9) 
11111
1 )]~('[ qwNFhEr
dt
d λλλ ++−=  (10) 
22212
2 )]~('~[ qwNFhEr
dt
d λελλ ++−=  (11) 
Let us first briefly interpret these different first-order conditions. According to (8) and (9), firm’s 
decisions with respect to recruitment are such that the marginal cost of hiring an additional worker 
(.)c  is equal to the marginal benefit due to that hiring. Since the marginal cost (.)c  is fixed by 
assumption (remind that education levels do not vary over time), this implies that 1λ  and 2λ  are 
constant, so that 0/1 =dtdλ  and 0/2 =dtdλ . From (10) and (11), it follows that 
)/())]~('[( 1111 qrwNFhE +−=λ  and )/())]~('~[( 2222 qrwNFhE +−= ελ . Since 11 )( λ=hc  and 
22 )( λ=hc  from (8) and (9), we obtain the following optimal wages for men and for women: 
)()()]~('[ 1111 hcqrNFEhw +−=  (12) 
)()()]~('~[ 2222 hcqrNFEhw +−= ε  (13) 
It is straightforward to give an interpretation to the previous equalities. At the equilibrium, we find that 
the optimal male wage is given by the difference between the expected marginal productivity 
)]~('[1 NFEh  and the turnover costs )()( 11 hcqr + . A similar reasoning applies for (13), but we note 
that there is an additional random term ε~  when defining the woman’s marginal productivity 
)]~('~[2 NFEh ε . The normality assumption for the random perturbation ε~  allows us to further specify 
the optimal wage policy for a competitive firm. 
Proposition 1. The optimal wage policy for the firm is such that: 
)()()]~('[ 1111 hcqrNFEhw +−=  (14) 
)()()]~(''[)]~('[ 22
2
222 hcqrhNFENFEhw +−+= υ  (15) 
where )~(/)~( 22 nEnVar εευ =  is the coefficient of variation associated to the female productivity. 
Proof. Given the normality assumption for ε~ , we can use the lemma of Stein (Rubinstein, 1976). Let 
us consider  two variables X  and Y  which are bivariate normally distributed. If the function )(Yf  is 
continuously differentiable, then ),cov())('())(,cov( YXYfEYfX = . By definition, we have 
))~(',~cov()]~('[)~()]~('~[ NFNFEENFE εεε += . Now, applying the Stein’s lemma to our problem, 
we get ))~,~cov()]~(''[))~(',~cov( 2211 εεε nhnhNFENF += . Provided that 1)~( =εE  and 
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2)~( εσε =Var , we deduce 2222211 )~,~cov( εσεε nhnhnh =+ . Using (13), we finally obtain the 
following female wage )()()]~(''[)]~('[ 222
22
222 hcqrNFEnhNFEhw +−+= εσ . 
Let us further expand the term )]~(''[2
22
2 NFEnh εσ . We know that 2222 )~( εσε nnVar =  and 
22 )~( nnE =ε  since 1)~( =εE . Hence, given the definition of )~(/)~( 22 nEnVar εευ = , it follows that 
)]~(''[)]~(''[ 222
22
2 NFEhNFEnh υσ ε = . QED 
With respect to our previous interpretation of the optimal wages, there is now an additional term in the 
definition of the optimal female wage. According to (15), the optimal wage for women is the sum of 
the marginal expected productivity )]~('[2 NFEh  and a negative term 
2
2)]
~(''[ hNFEυ , minus the 
opportunity cost in terms of turnover )()( 22 hcqr + . A central feature for our analysis deals with the 
interpretation of )]~(''[22 NFEhυ . As it stands, this term is a risk premium associated to the uncertainty 
on female productivity. 
In our setting, the optimal wage policy depends on the pattern of qualification ),( 21 hh , on the 
probability to quit the firm ),( 21 qq , on the interest rate r , on the shape of technology given by 'F  
and ''F , and on the coefficient of variation related to the female productivity υ . 
Corollary 1. The gender wage gap is given by: 
))()()(()]~(''[)]~('[)( 211
2
22121 hchcqrNFEhNFEhhww −+−−−=− υ  (16) 
Let us briefly comment the different factors which are expected to influence the gender wage gap. 
Imagine first a situation such that 0=υ , meaning that there is no uncertainty. In that case, the 
difference between 1w  and 2w  depends both on the difference in skill levels respectively for men and 
for women and on the pattern of turnover costs. In a situation characterized by similar skill levels for 
male and female workers (meaning that 21 hh = ), the male wage may still be higher  than the female 
wage when the inequality )()( 21 hchc <  holds. In that case, the gender wage gap would only be 
explained by the pattern of turnover costs. But imagine now a situation where uncertainty on the 
female productivity prevails, i.e. 0>υ . Then, our model formally explains the glass ceiling effect. 
Corollary 2. The glass ceiling effect is picked up by the term )]~(''[22 NFEhυ . 
According to the definition of the female wage, the negative risk premium 22)]
~(''[ hNFEυ  depends on 
the shape of the technology F , on the coefficient of variation for the female productivity, and also on 
the squared level of the woman’s skill level. As the gender wage gap is a convex positive function of 
2h  (remind that the risk premium )]
~(''[22 NFEhυ  is negative), one expects a significantly higher 
difference between male and female wages at the top of the income distribution. This is exactly the 
core of the glass ceiling hypothesis. 
So, our theoretical framework sheds light on the role of employer’s expectations on the propensity for 
workers to quit their current jobs. Even in a setting where human capital does not differ between men 
and women, we demonstrate that uncertainty on the female productivity is a sufficient condition to 
rationalize the existence of a glass ceiling. At that stage, it seems important to stress the difficulty to 
empirically assess the relevance of our model. Indeed, the two main implications are that i) the firm 
sets a lower wage for women given uncertainty and ii) the negative risk premium is higher for high-
skilled women. On the one hand, it is straightforward to evidence whether gender differences in wages 
vary along the income distribution, i.e. to give an answer to the question “does there exist a glass 
ceiling?”. On the other hand, it is much more difficult to provide an accurate measure of uncertainty 
on productivity. 
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That employers’ subjective expectations on the behaviours of their employees matter to explain the 
glass ceiling effect is a very important result, which has empirical implications. Indeed, the mobility of 
workers and their intention to quit their jobs are certainly determined by the firm’s environment, even 
partly. For instance, workers hired by a firm where high wages and good working conditions prevail 
have less incentive to look for other jobs. Therefore, not accounting for the firm-specific 
characterization is likely to affect the measurement of the gender wage gap throughout the distribution 
of wages. So, in what follows, we focus on a non-structural, econometric analysis where we 
investigate the magnitude of the glass ceiling effect in France and introduce into the earnings 
regressions some information on firms. 
3. THE FRENCH MATCHED WORKER-FIRM DATA 
The data we use in this paper are drawn from a unique French survey which matches information of 
both employers and employees, the 1992 INSEE survey on labour cost and wage structure (Enquêtes 
sur le Coût de la Main-d'Oeuvre et la Structure des Salaires en 1992, ECMOSS thereafter). It is well 
known that such data sets allow the structure of wages to be modelled while controlling for firm-
specific effects (see Abowd et alii, 1999). Specifically, the French survey contains information on 
150,000 different workers across 16,000 different workplaces7. The sampling population covered by 
these data is very broad, as all establishments are covered independently of their size and in all 
industries apart from agriculture, fisheries, non-traded services, and central and local government. 
The ECMOSS survey contains a great deal of information. Concerning the employees, data are 
available on workers' gross annual wage, which is broken down into fixed salary, bonuses, overtime, 
and data on their gender, age, nationality, tenure, occupation, education level and number of paid 
hours. There is also some detailed information on the employer, including main economic activity, 
size, geographical location, management style, work organisation and salary policy. In order to 
perform our econometric analysis, several additional variables have been constructed and we describe 
them below. 
Concerning the workers, we determine the total number of years of education calculated from the final 
level reached, total potential experience in the labour market which is given by age minus number of 
years of education minus six, hourly earnings (gross salary plus payments in kind, all divided by the 
number of paid hours over the year), and the average number of paid hours of training per worker in 
the establishment (the number of hours of paid training by worker by occupational category – 
executive or non-executive – divided by the total number of workers by occupational category)8. After 
deleting observations with missing values or outliers, the worker sample amounts to 
137,211 individuals divided into 14,693 establishments. Table 1 provides a description of the 
characteristics of the employees. 
Table 1: Description of the workers’ characteristics 
 
Main sample characteristics Mean [Min ; Max ] Standard dev. 
Number of observed employees per establishment 18.99 [2 ; 152] 15.53 
Sex (1 for men, 0 otherwise) 0.60   
Age 37.68 [16.25 ; 65] 10.30 
Nationality (1 if French, 0 otherwise) 0.93   
Hourly earnings (gross wage plus payments in kind, all divided by 
the number of paid hours over the year) 69.48 [29.00 ;395.83] 39.49 
Education (number of completed years of schooling) 12.77 [8 ; 18] 1.65 
Potential previous experience (Number of years of labour market 
experience: age - tenure - education – 6) 9.27 [0 ; 48.91] 8.72 
Tenure in the current establishment (number of years of tenure) 9.71 [0 ; 46.5] 8.84 
Executives (1 if executive, 0 otherwise) 0.11   
Number of hours paid work per year 1671.78 [33 ; 2310] 585.46 
Type of contract (1 if fixed duration contract, 0 otherwise) 0.08   
Workplace (1 if Paris, 0 otherwise) 0.19   
Source: Survey INSEE ECMOSS 1992. 
 The size of the sample is 137211 employees, working in 14693 establishments. 
                                                     
7 This labour cost survey is concurrently carried out in all European Union countries every four years and aims at providing comparable 
labour market statistics across EU countries. In the 1992 wave of this survey, INSEE matched the data with those on the wage structure. 
For previous studies which have estimated earnings functions on the same data, see among others Abowd et alii (2001), Destré and 
Nordman (2002), and Destré (2003). 
8 The education variable is constructed as follows. For a sub-sample of more than 8000 workers for whom the number of years of 
education is available (besides the highest paper certificate), we calculate the median number of years of education for each qualification 
considered. This indirect method for calculating the length of education has the advantage of partially removing the endogeneity of the 
education variable (see the discussion in Destré, 2003). 
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To test the glass ceiling hypothesis, one novelty of our approach is to control for firm level variables 
in the analysis of wage determination. We describe below the information that is utilised for a 
preliminary multivariate analysis of firm-related characteristics. The definitions and descriptive 
statistics of these variables appear in Table A1. 
First, we make use of twelve sectoral dummies (S1, S2, S3, S4, S5, S6, S7, S8, S9, S10, S11, S12), six 
dummies for the size of the establishments (T1, T2, T3, T4, T5, T6)9, and four dummies for the average 
number of paid hours of training per worker in the establishment (in increasing order, FF1, FF2, FF3, 
FF4). Firm level human capital variables are respectively average, standard deviation, maximum and 
distance to the maximum of workers’ education, experience off the current job and tenure in each 
establishment (respectively for education, experience and tenure: EDUCM, EXPHEM, ANCM, SDEDUC, 
SDEXPHE, SDANC, SUPEDUC, SUPEXPHE, SUPANC, SE, SEX, SA). 
The following variables relate to qualitative aspects of firms’ activity: dummies describing the 
intensity of business the past five years (“strongly growing” or “growing”: va1, “stable”: va2; 
“strongly decreasing” or “decreasing”: va3), whether activity is usually affected by seasonal 
movements (d21), whether it is rather regular (d31), or irregular (d32), whether firms have been 
affected by unusual shocks in 1992 (d4a1) and, if it is the case, whether it was a downturn (d4b1) or an 
upturn (d4b2). We also make use of qualitative features of intra-firm wage determination such as 
dummies for the presence of union representatives (ps1), for the existence of wage negotiations in 
1992 (d151), and for the use of a formal wage scale system for blue collar workers’ wage base 
(d19a1). If such a formal system is used, the questionnaire provides further information as to whether 
it is based on the branch’s collective agreement (d19b1), on the firm’s collective agreement (d19b2) or 
on another evaluation scheme (evaluation of posts, d19b3). 
Further detailed information describes the importance accorded by employers to different criteria in 
individual wage increases (for both blue collar and white collar workers). In the questionnaire, the 
answers were ranked according to three different levels of importance: “none”, “weak”, “medium”, 
and “very strong”. In our analysis, we make use of dummies taking into account the answers “very 
strong”:  workers’ tenure in the job (d3513), increase in workers’ performance (d3523), workers’ 
training effort (d3533), accumulation of experience (d3543), acquisition of versatility (d3553), 
increase in workers’ responsibilities (d3563), intra-firm mobility (d3573), and difficulty of workers’ 
eventual replacement (d3583). 
Qualitative variables are then utilised to describe the extent to which employers favour individual or 
general wage increases in their wage policy: whether the base wage progressions “exclusively” (d331), 
“principally” (d332), “little” (d333) or “never” (d334) depend on individual increases and on general 
increases (respectively, d341, d342, d343, d344). Dummies regarding individual bonuses according to 
performances are also introduced in the following way: d3911 indicates whether firms give relative 
bonuses (the best workers are awarded), d3921 describes whether bonuses are of “absolute” type (the 
production standards are exceeded). If these two schemes exist in the same firm, d39b1 reports which 
one is the most important (equals to one if it is relative bonuses). Finally, d411 signals firms having 
implemented an explicit wage policy characterised by precise objectives. 
Firms’ organisational features are likely to influence employers’ wage settings as well as skill 
diffusion and acquisition processes (Lindbeck and Snower, 2000; Caroli et alii, 2001; Greenan, 2003). 
We construct dummies describing the firm’s hierarchical structure such as the number of intermediate 
levels of management between the firm’s manager and the blue collar workers assigned to productive 
lines (zero levels: d250; from 1 to 4: d251; from 5 to 10: d252; 11 levels and above: d253), dummies 
indicating the existence of job rotation schemes and how they are implemented (whether they are put 
into practice within production teams: d26a1, and whether they are intended to some versatile workers 
independently from team working: d26b1), a dummy when direct collaborations between employees 
of different departments are encouraged (d281), a dummy reporting whether achieved work is 
“permanently” controlled rather than “intermittently” or “occasionally” (d301), a dummy signalling 
whether individual performances are “systematically” controlled rather than “occasionally” or “never” 
(d311), and a dummy for the existence of a formal system to measure individual performances (d321). 
                                                     
9 The dummies are defined as follows: less than 20 employees (T1), 20 to 49 (T2), 50 to 99 (T3), 100 to 199 (T4), 200 to 499 (T5), and 
more than 500 employees (T6). 
12 
4. ECONOMETRIC STRATEGY 
Quantile regression and least absolute deviation estimators have recently become very popular 
estimation methods (Koenker and Bassett, 1978, Buchinsky, 1998). This technique can be interpreted 
as using the error distribution in the earnings equation for the definition of different earnings 
categories, i.e. quantiles, instead of the observed earnings differentials. The popularity of these 
methods relies on three sets of properties. 
First, they provide robust estimates, particularly for misspecification errors related to non-normality 
and heteroskedasticity, but also for the presence of outliers due to data contamination. Second, they 
allow the researcher to focus on specific parts of the distribution of interest, which is the conditional 
distribution of the dependent variable, and to estimate the marginal effect of a covariate on log 
earnings at various points in the distribution. So, quantile regressions allow to estimate the effect of 
gender, education or experience on log earnings at the bottom of the log earnings distribution (at the 
5th percentile), at the median, and at the top of the distribution (at the 95th percentile). Third, quantile 
regressions are appropriate when earnings functions contribute only to a small part of the variance of 
earnings, so that the distribution of earnings and the distribution of errors are close10. 
The ECMOSS survey allows the structure of wages to be modelled while controlling firm-specific 
effects. With our matched data, we can deal with the firm heterogeneity by introducing firm 
characteristics into the earnings equation. Nevertheless, a difficulty is that we cannot model 
unobserved individual heterogeneity in the way of Abowd et alii (1999) as this is a cross-sectional data 
set. In order to temper the effect of firm heterogeneity, the natural attempt is to estimate firm fixed 
effects models including firm-specific dummies. Nevertheless, this technique seems to be futile in our 
case. Indeed, as we estimate quantile regressions, the large number of establishments rules out the 
possibility of doing this11. 
An alternative approach is described in Muller and Nordman (2004, 2005). It consists of summarising 
the main information on the firms' characteristics using a multivariate analysis and introducing the 
computed principal components (factors) stemming from this analysis into the earnings functions. 
Using factors may be seen as a further step with respect to those studies which have added mean firm 
variables into earnings functions, individual characteristics being controlled for. By contrast with 
firms’ fixed effects that are introduced in wage regressions, the principal factors suggest qualitative 
characteristics of the firms. Specifically, we use a principal component analysis (PCA) to summarise 
the information about the surveyed establishments12. 
This method is based on the calculation of the inertia axes for a cloud of points that represents the data 
in table format. There are different possible uses of factor analysis in this context. First, factor 
analyses can be used to elicit hidden characteristics correlated with observable characteristics. Second, 
PCA results could be utilised as a guide to replace these hidden firm characteristics with observable 
characteristics correlated with the main factors (as in Muller and Nordman, 2004). Third, and foremost 
in our case, the PCA is used as a substitute for firm fixed effect regressions. Indeed, the PCA allows us 
to investigate the determinants of the firm effects in our data. As long as the computed factors account 
for most of the firm heterogeneity bias, this approach allows us to obtain consistent estimates of the 
returns to worker characteristics and of the gender wage gap. 
For our purpose, the first ten inertia axes (the estimated factors which are linear components of all the 
firm’s characteristics described in the previous section) concentrate a large proportion of the total 
variance of the original variables (about 40%) and reflect, therefore, a fair amount of the relevant 
                                                     
10 In our empirical analysis, we rely on bootstrap confidence intervals for quantile regressions in order to avoid the consequences of the 
slow convergence of classical confidence intervals of estimates (Hahn, 1995). However, given the large size of our sample, the results 
are only marginally modified.  
11 However, very recently, Koenker (2005) has proposed a new advanced method which allows estimating fixed effects quantile 
regressions with a large number of fixed effects, but the estimation is far from being straightforward. 
12 In principal component analysis, a set of variables is transformed into orthogonal components, which are linear combinations of the 
variables and have maximum variance subject to being uncorrelated with one another. Typically, the first few components account for a 
large proportion of the total variance of the original variables, and hence can be used to summarize the original data. The computed 
factors were rotated using an oblique rotation. As in Muller and Nordman (2005), we have tried many other techniques of factor 
analysis, which all lead to similar conclusions.   
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information about the firm’s characteristics. The correlation coefficients of the firms’ characteristics 
with the first ten factors are used for the interpretation of the computed factors. The other factors 
represent a negligible amount of the statistical information and are dropped from the analysis. 
Further details on this rotated PCA can be found in Muller and Nordman (2005) and obtained from the 
authors upon request. Let us note that the first five factors are closely associated with the size of the 
firms, their workers’ human capital characteristics (mean, variance, minimum and maximum of 
workers’ education and tenure) as well as the firms’ training capacity. Therefore, they reflect the 
characteristics of large-sized firms with high human capital density as compared to small-sized firms 
frequently associated with low-skilled workers. Factors 5 to 7 are closely correlated with the firms’ 
sectoral belonging and organisational features (firm’s hierarchical structure, supervision) while the 
remaining factors are more strongly related to the various criteria used by employers for defining their 
implemented wage policy. We are now ready to comment on our econometric analysis. 
5. QUANTILE REGRESSIONS ESTIMATES 
We turn to the discussion of the different quantile regressions which control for both workers’ and 
firms’ observed characteristics, in order to assess the existence and the extent to which the glass 
ceiling phenomenon exists in France. 
We first study the effects of differences in characteristics on the gender earnings gap at different points 
in the distribution. We carry out a set of quantile regressions on the pooled dataset, i.e. with both men 
and women, which imposes the restriction that the returns to included labour market characteristics are 
the same for the two genders. The gender dummies in these regressions are interpreted as the effects of 
gender on log earnings at the various percentiles once one controls for any differences in these labour 
market characteristics between genders. Estimates for various specifications are reported in Table 2, 
where we only focus on the magnitude of the dummy coefficient for female. 
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Table 2: Gender dummy coefficients using alternative quantile earnings models 
 
Specification Quantile regressions (percentage of the earnings distribution) OLS Firm fixed effects 
 0.05 0.10 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.90 0.95 mean mean 
-0.0762*** -0.0968*** -0.1428*** -0.1734*** -0.2223*** -0.3295*** -0.4096*** -0.1912*** -0.2077*** (1) Gender log earnings gap (n= 137,211) 
(0.0018) (0.0020) (0.0021) (0.0026) (0.0035) (0.0053) (0.0081) (0.0023) (0.0022) 
-0.0859*** -0.1006*** -0.1264*** -0.1592*** -0.1948*** -0.2270*** -0.2446*** -0.1779*** -0.1834*** (2) Basic control variablesa (n= 137,211) 
(0.0022) (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0021) (0.0027) (0.0040) (0.0061) (0.0019) (0.0019) 
-0.0850*** -0.0978*** -0.1219*** -0.1514*** -0.2051*** -0.2558*** -0.2839*** -0.1803*** -0.1843*** (3) Extended control variablesb (n= 137,211) 
(0.0021) (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0018) (0.0024) (0.0037) (0.0052) (0.0019) (0.0019) 
-0.0831*** -0.0956*** -0.1238*** -0.1527*** -0.2089*** -0.2708*** -0.3041*** -0.1881*** _ (4) Extended control variables plus 12 sectoral 
dummies (n= 137,211) (0.0023) (0.0020) (0.0019) (0.0020) (0.0025) (0.0043) (0.0058) (0.0019)  
-0.0921*** -0.1053*** -0.1288*** -0.1570*** -0.2018*** -0.2499*** -0.2757*** -0.1825*** _ (5) Extended control variables plus 10 firms' factor 
effectsc (n= 137,169) (0.0024) (0.0020) (0.0018) (0.0019) (0.0026) (0.0038) (0.0052) (0.0018)  
-0.0746*** -0.0814*** -0.0969*** -0.1148*** -0.1381*** -0.1690*** -0.1955*** -0.1267*** _ (6) Extended control variables plus 12 sectoral and 
29 occupational dummies (n= 137,211) (0.0030) (0.0024) (0.0020) (0.0017) (0.0021) (0.0030) (0.0041) (0.0017)  
-0.0848*** -0.0904*** -0.1017*** -0.1219*** -0.1447*** -0.1764*** -0.2008*** -0.1326*** -0.1098*** (7) Extended control variables, firms' factor effects 
and 29 occupational dummies (n=137,169) (0.0030) (0.0023) (0.0019) (0.0017) (0.0021) (0.0028) (0.0039) (0.0017) (0.0016) 
Survey INSEE ECMOSS 1992. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, ** and * mean respectively significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
a: basic control variables include education, experience off the current job, tenure in the current firm, their squared values, a dummy for non-French workers, dummies for the matrimonial status (single, widowed, divorced) and 
the number of dependent children. 
b: extended control variables include the basic control variables mentioned above plus a dummy for the workplace (1 if Paris region), a dummy for the type of work contract (1 if CDD, “Contrat à durée déterminée”) and the 
logarithm of the number of hours paid work per year.  
c: the variables introduced in the factor analysis are educm, exphem, ancm, sdeduc, sdexphe, sdanc, supeduc, supexphe, supanc, sa, se, sex, s1, s2, s3, s4, s5, s6, s7, s8, s9, s10, s11, s12, t1, t2, t3, t4, t5, t6, ff1, ff2, ff3, ff4, va1, 
va2, va3, d21, d31, d32, d4a1, d4b1, d4b2, ps1, d151, d19a1, d19b1, d19b2, d19b3, d250, d251, d252, d253, d26a1, d26b1, d281, d301, d311, d321, d331, d332, d333, d341, d342, d3513, d3523, d3533, d3543, d3553, d3563, 
d3573, d3583, d3911, d3921, d39b1, d411.  
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The first row presents a series of simple quantile regressions in which we condition the log earnings 
on gender at the 5th, 10th, 25th, 50th (median), 75th, 90th, and 95th percentiles, without any control 
variable13. We notice that the observed log earnings gap increases as we move up the earnings 
distribution with a sharp acceleration after the 75th percentile. For instance, at the 75th percentile, we 
see a raw gender earnings gap of slightly less than 25%. This means that the log earnings of a man at 
the 75th percentile of the male earnings distribution is a bit more than 22 points above the log earnings 
of a woman at the 75th percentile of the female earnings distribution. 
Interestingly, very similar patterns have emerged in other European countries. First, male and female 
earnings are closer at the bottom of the earnings distribution. Second, male and female earnings are 
extremely unequal at the top of the distribution, up to a maximum difference of about 50%. Third, 
there is a steady increase in the gender log earnings gap as we move up in the earnings distribution. 
Fourth, there is a sharp acceleration in the increase in the gender log earnings gap starting at about the 
75th or 80th percentile in the earnings distribution. Following Albrecht et alii (2003), De la Rica et alii 
(2005) or Arulampalam et alii (2004), we interpret this last feature of the gender log earnings gap by 
percentile as a glass ceiling evidence. 
Then, we examine various quantile estimates of the gender dummy coefficients when adding both 
male and female’s labour market characteristics. Several specifications have been considered, the list 
of explanatory variables being further described in Table 214. In what follows, we only focus on the 
gender dummy coefficient which indicates the extent to which the gender earnings gap remains 
unexplained at the different quantiles after controlling for individual differences in various 
combinations of characteristics. We begin by introducing into the earnings equations the covariates 
commonly used in labour economics, i.e. education, potential experience, tenure, dummies for the 
matrimonial status, nationality, and the number of dependent children. Then, we add job-specific 
variables such as the type of work contract, the workplace, the number of hours worked per year, 
sector of employment, and occupation. 
When we control for education, experience off the current job, firm tenure, and other basic socio-
economic characteristics (panel 2, Table 2), the gender dummies increase in absolute value relative to 
the raw gender dummy of panel 1 at the 5th and the 10th percentile, but then decrease from about the 
20th through the 95th percentiles. The OLS gender dummy coefficient (at the mean) also diminishes. 
One explanation could be that, in the first quartile of the log hourly earnings distribution, women 
display more labour market experience than men while this is not the case as for workers belonging to 
the second, third and fourth quartiles.  
In the panel 3 of Table 2, we introduce the extended control variables which include basic control 
variables plus the type of work contract, the log of hours paid per year, and the location of the firm. 
The quantile estimates indicate that the gender dummy decreases in absolute value from the 5th to the 
median percentile as compared to the preceding model. Then, from about the 75th to the 95th, however, 
the gender dummy increases. This might be a first indication that job-related characteristics (working 
conditions) do matter in explaining why the earnings gap is much greater at the upper tail of the 
earnings distribution15. 
We next present the estimated gender dummy coefficients after adding 12 sectoral dummies in the 
quantile regressions (panel 4). The same picture emerges from these estimates, and the gender dummy 
is reduced only minimally at the bottom of the earnings distribution and slightly increases from about 
the 20th percentile and more substantially at the top of the earnings distribution. Of course, the sector 
of employment is to some extent an endogenous characteristic since the choice of sector in which to 
work is typically made after education is completed. 
                                                     
13 As pointed out in Albrecht et alii (2003), these quantile regression estimates have the advantage to attach standard errors to the estimated 
gender gaps at the various percentiles. The coefficient estimates for the gender dummy in this panel are identical to the log earnings 
gaps. 
14 The full set of estimates is in an appendix.  
15 For instance, men are more likely to have a temporary work contract (CDD) than women are as we move up along the earnings 
distribution: 18.2% for both men and women in the first quartile against 2.5% for men and 4.5% for women in the fourth quartile.  
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In panel 5, we account for the firms’ computed factors stemming from the factor analysis. In so doing, 
our aim is to substitute a firm fixed-effect regression by a “firm factor effect” regression that may 
account for qualitative aspects of firms’ wage policies and, in particular, for human capital external 
effects. In a sense, following Muller and Nordman (2004, 2005), we generalize the approach 
developed in Cardoso (1999) who regresses the firms’ fixed effects on different variables16. For our 
purpose, the first ten computed factors concentrate most of the relevant information about the firms’ 
characteristics (see previous section). A Wald test rejects at the 1 percent level the null hypothesis that 
the coefficients of these ten factors are jointly equal to zero. Since the covariates introduced in the 
factor analysis include the sectoral dummies, we omit these explanatory variables into the earnings 
functions. 
For the sake of comparison, we have also performed a linear regression with firms’ fixed effects. The 
female dummy coefficient in panel 3 (-0.1843) can be compared with the one estimated at the mean 
with the firm factor effect, which is equal to -0.1825 (panel 5). So, the female coefficient is slightly 
reduced as we move from sector fixed effects or firm fixed effects models towards a firm factor effects 
specification. It may be that the computed factors stemming from our PCA of firms’ characteristics 
add a qualitative aspect of the firms’ wage policy to our regressions that fixed effects models, either 
with sector or firm dummies, may not be able to totally control for. 
According to the quantile estimates reported in panel 5, we find that taking into account the firms’ 
factors increases the gender dummy coefficient in absolute value at the lower tail of the log earnings 
distribution (from the 5th to the median percentile). Conversely, the coefficient is significantly reduced 
at the upper tail of the distribution, especially above the 75th percentile. Now, the gender earnings gap 
amounts to about 31% at the 95th percentile while it amounted to more than 35% with the extended 
and sectoral control variables. Therefore, a first novelty of our analysis with respect to the previous 
literature is to show that controlling for firms’ characteristics reduces the extent of the glass ceiling 
phenomenon, albeit moderately17. 
Finally, panels 6 and 7 of Table 2 present the quantile log earnings regression estimates adding 29 
occupational dummies. We present these estimates separately because there is no clear consensus as to 
whether occupation (and to some extent industry) should be taken into account to assess the extent of 
the gender wage gap. If employers differentiate between men and women through their tendency to 
hire into certain occupations, then occupational assignment is an outcome of employer practices rather 
than an outcome of individual choice or productivity differences18. While panel 6 presents the gender 
dummy coefficient of a sector fixed effect model, panel 7 accounts for the coefficients of a firm factor 
effect model. Again, both sets of estimates are very close. 
As might be expected, controlling for occupation considerably reduces the gender gap throughout the 
earnings distribution. In panel 7, the unexplained gender gap falls to 8.8% at the 5th percentile and, 
more importantly, to 22% at the 95th percentile (compared to 9.4% and 31.7% in panel 5). We would 
argue that the effect of controlling for occupation on the gender earnings gap reflects the occupational 
segregation that may be present in France. However, we also note that if the gender earnings gap 
varies significantly at the upper tail of the earnings distribution from panel 1 to panel 7, it remains 
remarkably stable at the bottom 5th or 10th percentiles. 
To summarize our results, we find that after adjusting for a set of socio-economic control variables as 
well as for firm-related characteristics, the gender earnings gap is significantly reduced at the top of 
the distribution. However, it is still greater at the top than at the bottom of the distribution, meaning 
that the glass ceiling pattern remains in the estimated unexplained gender earnings gaps. As a final 
                                                     
16 An alternative strategy would be to estimate earnings functions including all the firms’ characteristics used in the factor analysis. We 
tried this out, but our models suffered from severe multicollinearity problems (some important regressors were dropped or insignificant) 
since firms’ characteristics are often highly correlated to each other. By definition, the main components derived from the factor analysis 
are poorly correlated and also have the advantage to sum up the main statistical information of these firm level variables. 
17 Note that this result is not sensitive to the number of included firms’ factors in the earnings functions. In fact, adding more factors (up to 
a total of 20) does not change significantly the estimated coefficients on the gender dummy at each considered quantile of the earnings 
distribution.  
18 Conversely, one can argue that analyses that omit occupation and industry may overlook the importance of background and choice-based 
characteristics on wage outcomes, while analyses that fully control for these variables may undervalue the significance of labour market 
constraints on wage outcomes (Altonji and Blank, 1999). 
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step, we have attempted to investigate whether the uncertainty argument makes sense to explain the 
gender earnings gap. Unfortunately, it appears quite difficult to provide an accurate measurement of 
the uncertainty assumption, so that we have to rely on proxy variables evaluated on the firm sample. 
To better understand the factors that influence firms to pay different premia for men and women, we 
choose to focus on the difference between the male and female firm fixed effects. As pointed out in 
Meng and Meurs (2004), this difference is an estimate of the within-firm gender wage gap. 
We first get the firm unobserved heterogeneity components from the previous male and female fixed 
effects regressions and compute the difference. Then, we introduce a set of covariates related to 
observable firm characteristics in order to explain the within-firm gender earnings gap. The difference 
in fixed effects is estimated using a weighted OLS regression, and the corresponding estimates are in 
Table 3. Explaining the within-firm gender gap remains difficult, as the R² is around 0.0319. We 
observe that the firm sectoral dummies along with the firm size affect this gender gap, but we focus in 
what follows on the covariates which are more likely to be related to uncertainty. 
Table 3: Firm fixed effects regression 
(Dependent variable: FFEm-FFEf) 
 
Variables Weighted OLS 
Constant 0.0620 (0.0392) 
S1 0.0022 (0.0361) 
S2 0.0000 (0.0000) 
S3 -0.0653* (0.0349) 
S4 -0.0230 (0.0347) 
S5 -0.0625* (0.0345) 
S6 -0.0417 (0.0383) 
S7 -0.0455 (0.0334) 
S8 -0.0099 (0.0338) 
S9 -0.0383 (0.0325) 
S10 -0.1000*** (0.0365) 
S11 -0.0172 (0.0422) 
S12 -0.0657* (0.0359) 
T1 -0.0279*** (0.0106) 
T2 -0.0259** (0.0103) 
T3 -0.0224** (0.0105) 
T4 0.0000 (0.0000) 
T5 0.0212** (0.0100) 
T6 0.0121 (0.0129) 
PS1 -0.0370*** (0.0106) 
D19B2 -0.0144 (0.0149) 
D19B1 -0.0246** (0.0100) 
D19B3 -0.0199 (0.0176) 
D26A1 -0.0019 (0.0022) 
D26B1 -0.0164* (0.0090) 
D281 0.0076 (0.0082) 
D301 0.0085 (0.0088) 
D311 0.0049 (0.0087) 
D321 -0.0185* (0.0110) 
D331 -0.0043 (0.0164) 
D332 -0.0213* (0.0110) 
D341 -0.0198* (0.0103) 
D342 -0.0141 (0.0090) 
D3583 0.0238* (0.0142) 
D39B1 0.0257* (0.0141) 
Observations 5931 
R-squared 0.0298 
Survey INSEE ECMOSS 1992. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, ** and * mean respectively significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
FFEm and FFEf respectively stand for male and female firm fixed effects. The regression also includes the following explanatory variables: 
VA1, VA2, D21, D32, D4A1, D4B1,D4B2, D252, D253,D131,D151, D3513, D3523, D353, D3543, D3553, D3563, D3573, D411. 
                                                     
19 Meng and Meurs (2004) obtain a similar result, since they find that less than 4% of the variation of the within-firm gender earnings gap is 
explained by observable firm characteristics in France and about 7% in Australia. 
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A very significant effect is the presence of union representatives (PS1), which strongly reduces the 
within-firm gender gap. There are at least two explanations. On the one hand, it may be that the 
presence of a trade union prevents the firm from setting up wage discrimination between male and 
female workers, especially if the objective of the union is to reduce wage inequality within the firm. 
On the other hand, wages are most often higher in firms when there is a trade union, and the latter also 
allows for a better job protection. As the probability to be dismissed may be significantly lower in 
such cases, this reduces uncertainty on the worker’s productivity (incentives to quit the job are 
lessened). A similar interpretation may be given for the use of a formal wage scale system based on 
the branch’s collective agreement (D19B1), which also diminishes the within-firm gender earnings 
gap. 
A second result in favour of the uncertainty argument concerns the variable D3583, which is 
significant at the 10 percent level. This variable indicates whether there exist some difficulties for the 
employer with workers’ eventual replacement. It may be that such difficulties are the sign of more 
competitive industries with an increased turnover and less stability of workers. Also, being less 
confident as to the regularity and the presence of one’s employees may entail more fear from 
employers about the possibility to replace vacant workers. Estimates in Table 4 show that such 
difficulties increase the within-firm gender gap. Finally, we also note that the variable D39B1 
increases the within-firm gap. When firms favour relative bonuses such that the best workers are 
awarded, the within-firm gender gap is increased. 
6. CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
In this paper, we have brought both some theory and empirical evidence on the glass ceiling 
hypothesis, according to which the gender wage gap is more important at the upper tail of the wage 
distribution. Several studies have recently shed light on this phenomenon in European countries 
(Albrecht et alii, 2003, De la Rica et alii, 2005, Arulampalam et alii, 2004). 
To rationalize the glass ceiling effect, we have introduced some uncertainty on the female productivity 
in a competitive labour market model. Women are likely to have more frequently interrupted careers 
(because of birth event for instance), and they may choose to quit the labour force either to spend time 
with their children, to care for elderly parents, or to move with their husband when the latter is 
promoted in a new location. We formally prove that this uncertainty entails a risk premium in the 
wage determination. As the premium is a quadratic function of the female level of human capital, the 
model predicts a larger wage gap at the top of the distribution. 
We assess the relevance of the glass ceiling hypothesis in France using the 1992 ECMOSS data set, 
which provides information on both employers and employees. This is an empirical novelty with 
respect to the previous studies on the glass ceiling effect, which have neglected the role of the firm 
characteristics. Whatever the theoretical explanation behind the glass ceiling, the work environment is 
likely to affect the magnitude of the gender wage gap along the earnings distribution. Results from 
quantile regressions indicate that there exists a significant glass ceiling effect in France. While male 
and female earnings are close at the bottom of the income distribution, there is a strong increase in the 
gender earnings gap above the 75th percentile of this distribution. Also, it indeed matters to control for 
the firms’ characteristics. Following Muller and Nordman (2004, 2005), we rely on a principal 
component analysis to extract the most influential factors of the surveyed establishments in order to 
introduce them into the earnings regressions. This approach allows accounting for qualitative aspects 
of the firms and, in particular, for their implemented wage policy, which may not be the case when 
one controls for unobserved heterogeneity through firm fixed effect models.  
According to the French data, the gender earnings gap would be overstated at the top of the 
distribution when the influence of firms’ characteristics is omitted. However, despite of the reduction 
in the earnings gap for the more well-paid workers, there is still a large and significant difference 
between the male and female earnings. Focusing on the differences in firm fixed effects for male and 
female, we find that the within-firm gender earnings gap is increased when there are no union 
representatives in the firm and when employers express fear regarding the recruitment of workers in 
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case of replacements. In both cases, uncertainty on the employee’s stability seems more a concern for 
employers. 
A shortcoming of our analysis relate to the relevance of this uncertainty argument. Indeed, we have 
proposed a model which explains why women receive significantly lower wages than men only at the 
upper tail of the earnings distribution. While the consequence of uncertainty on female productivity is 
to lead to a glass ceiling effect, it may be that there exist other theoretical explanations which could 
rationalize this phenomenon (see De la Rica et alii, 2005). Clearly, the difficulty for researchers would 
be to construct formal models leading to testable, differentiated predictions. While there is now a 
burgeoning literature which evidences the relevance of the glass ceiling effect in industrialised 
countries, better understanding the origins and causes of this important stylised fact remains an 
important issue which is left for future research. 
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APPENDICES 
Table A 1: Descriptive statistics of the firms’ characteristics  
Variables Mean Standard deviation Min Max 
Firms’ human capital characteristics     
EDUCM 12.781 1.081 10 18 
EDUCMNEW 12.783 1.116 9.5 18 
EXPHEM 9.991 5.228 0 37.39 
ANCM 8.544 5.662 0 33.81 
SDEDUC 1.009 0.844 0 4.95 
SDEDUCNEW 0.990 0.840 0 5.16 
SDEXPHE 7.445 3.477 0 28.34 
SDANC 5.610 3.577 0 27.28 
SUPEDUC 14.269 1.928 10 18 
SUPEXPHE 21.881 9.347 0 48.92 
SUPANC 17.028 10.335 0 46.50 
SA 4.930 6.717 0 42.58 
SE 1.511 1.921 0 8 
SEX 5.888 7.903 0 43.25  
Sectoral dummies     
S1 : INDUSTRIES AGRICOLES ET ALIMENTAIRES 0.028  0 1 
S2 : PRODUCTION ET DISTRIBUTION D’ENERGIE 0.011  0 1 
S3 : BIENS INTERMEDIAIRES 0.054  0 1 
S4 : BIENS D’EQUIPEMENT 0.055  0 1 
S5 : BIENS DE CONSOMMATION COURANTE 0.065  0 1 
S6 : BATIMENT GENIE CIVIL ET AGRICOLE 0.073  0 1 
S7 : COMMERCE 0.173  0 1 
S8 : TRANSPORT ET TÉLÉCOMMUNICATION 0.082  0 1 
S9 : SERVICES MARCHANDS 0.398  0 1 
S10 :  LOCATION CREDIT-BAIL 0.009  0 1 
S11 : ASSURANCES 0.020  0 1 
S12 : ORGANISMES FINANCIERS 0.033  0 1  
Firm size     
T1: less than 20 employees 0.313  0 1 
T2 : 20 to 49 employees 0.341  0 1 
T3 : 50 to 99 employees 0.153  0 1 
T4 : 100 to 199 employees 0.066  0 1 
T5 : 200 to 499 employees 0.063  0 1 
T6 : more than 500 employees 0.065  0 1 
Declared average number of paid hours of training per worker and per year in 
the establishment (dummies) 
FF1 : zero hour or no hours declared 
 
 
0.498  
 
 
0 
 
 
1 
FF2 : 1 to 10 hours  0.216  0 1 
FF3 : 11 to 40 hours 0.203  0 1 
FF4 : more than 40 hours 0.060  0 1  
Firms’ general and organisational characteristics     
VA1   0.440  0 1 
VA2  0.293  0 1 
VA3  0.210  0 1 
D21  0.360  0 1 
D31  2.448 2.225 1 9 
D32  1.934 3.463 0 9 
D4A1 0.333  0 1 
D4B1 0.038  0 1 
D4B2 0.308  0 1 
PS1 0.252  0 1 
D151 0.225  0 1 
D19A1 0.769  0 1 
D19B1 0.614  0 1 
D19B2 0.099  0 1 
D19B3 0.065  0 1 
D250 0.222  0 1 
D251 0.673  0 1 
D252 0.035  0 1 
D253 0.000  0 1 
D26A1 2.258 1.738 1 9 
D26B1 0.284  0 1 
D281 0.499  0 1 
D301 0.618  0 1 
D311 0.361  0 1 
D321 0.209  0 1 
D331 0.057  0 1 
D332 0.148  0 1 
D333 0.260  0 1 
D334 0.256  0 1 
D341 0.235  0 1 
D342 0.381  0 1 
D343 0.125  0 1 
D344 0.145  0 1 
D3513 0.064  0 1 
D3523 0.359  0 1 
D3533 0.087  0 1 
D3543 0.166  0 1 
D3553 0.157  0 1 
D3563 0.321  0 1 
D3573 0.097  0 1 
D3583 0.063  0 1 
D3911 0.403  0 1 
D3921 0.158  0 1 
D39B1 0.076  0 1 
D411 0.206  0 1 
Source: Survey INSEE ECMOSS 1992. The number of establishments is 14,693. 
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Table A 2: Earnings functions, with basic control variables 
(Dependent variable: Log hourly earnings) 
 
Quantile regressions OLS Variables 
0.05 0.10 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.90 0.95 mean 
-0.0859*** -0.1006*** -0.1264*** -0.1592*** -0.1948*** -0.2270*** -0.2446*** -0.1779*** Dummy for female 
(0.0022) (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0021) (0.0027) (0.0040) (0.0061) (0.0019) 
3.0594*** 2.9315*** 2.6759*** 2.4401*** 2.3124*** 2.2892*** 2.3880*** 2.4047*** Constant 
(0.0084) (0.0073) (0.0079) (0.0098) (0.0135) (0.0197) (0.0289) (0.0088) 
0.0406*** 0.0540*** 0.0816*** 0.1102*** 0.1327*** 0.1475*** 0.1499*** 0.1167*** Years of schooling 
(0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0009) (0.0013) (0.0020) (0.0006) 
0.0020*** 0.0032*** 0.0074*** 0.0143*** 0.0237*** 0.0353*** 0.0434*** 0.0167*** Years of experience off the current establishment 
(0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0011) (0.0003) 
-0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0002*** -0.0003*** -0.0004*** -0.0006*** -0.0007*** -0.0003*** (Years of experience off the current firm)2 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
0.0159*** 0.0194*** 0.0242*** 0.0274*** 0.0273*** 0.0265*** 0.0244*** 0.0241*** Years of tenure in the current firm 
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0011) (0.0003) 
-0.0002*** -0.0002*** -0.0002*** -0.0002*** -0.0001*** -0.0000 0.0001 -0.0002*** (Years of tenure in the current firm)2 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
-0.0604*** -0.0758*** -0.1004*** -0.1275*** -0.1402*** -0.1211*** -0.1071*** -0.1351*** Dummy for non-French 
(0.0047) (0.0041) (0.0042) (0.0046) (0.0059) (0.0088) (0.0135) (0.0042) 
-0.0301*** -0.0262*** -0.0314*** -0.0280*** -0.0257*** -0.0260*** -0.0277*** -0.0357*** Dummy for single 
(0.0031) (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0029) (0.0037) (0.0054) (0.0084) (0.0026) 
-0.0236** -0.0297*** -0.0423*** -0.0497*** -0.0748*** -0.1240*** -0.0862*** -0.0611*** Dummy for widowed 
(0.0100) (0.0087) (0.0088) (0.0098) (0.0124) (0.0182) (0.0281) (0.0088) 
-0.0027 0.0015 0.0034 0.0049 -0.0035 -0.0140* -0.0039 -0.0008 Dummy for divorced 
(0.0047) (0.0041) (0.0041) (0.0046) (0.0058) (0.0085) (0.0131) (0.0041) 
0.0112*** 0.0132*** 0.0143*** 0.0163*** 0.0175*** 0.0172*** 0.0203*** 0.0173*** Number of dependent children 
(0.0012) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0012) (0.0018) (0.0027) (0.0009) 
Observations 137211 137211 137211 137211 137211 137211 137211 137211 
Pseudo R-squared 0.1131 0.1402 0.1823 0.2151 0.2347 0.2509 0.2494 0.3534 
Survey INSEE ECMOSS 1992. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, ** and * mean respectively significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
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Table A 3: Earnings functions, with extended control variables 
(Dependent variable: Log hourly earnings) 
 
Quantile regressions OLSVariables 
0.05 0.10 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.90 0.95 mean 
-0.0850*** -0.0978*** -0.1219*** -0.1514*** -0.2051*** -0.2558*** -0.2839*** -0.1803***Dummy for female 
(0.0021) (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0018) (0.0024) (0.0037) (0.0052) (0.0019) 
2.8268*** 2.7226*** 2.5050*** 2.3916*** 2.5172*** 2.9192*** 3.3144*** 2.4863*** Constant 
(0.0147) (0.0132) (0.0136) (0.0137) (0.0182) (0.0286) (0.0405) (0.0138) 
0.0432*** 0.0538*** 0.0773*** 0.1019*** 0.1224*** 0.1340*** 0.1368*** 0.1090*** Years of schooling 
(0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0008) (0.0013) (0.0017) (0.0006) 
0.0021*** 0.0028*** 0.0064*** 0.0123*** 0.0206*** 0.0307*** 0.0362*** 0.0147*** Years of experience off the current establishment 
(0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0009) (0.0003) 
-0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0002*** -0.0003*** -0.0004*** -0.0005*** -0.0006*** -0.0003*** (Years of experience off the current firm)2 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
0.0147*** 0.0174*** 0.0216*** 0.0253*** 0.0269*** 0.0298*** 0.0310*** 0.0239*** Years of tenure in the current firm 
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0010) (0.0004) 
-0.0001*** -0.0002*** -0.0002*** -0.0002*** -0.0001*** -0.0002*** -0.0002*** -0.0002*** (Years of tenure in the current firm)2 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
-0.1045*** -0.1240*** -0.1553*** -0.1839*** -0.1982*** -0.1906*** -0.1558*** -0.1961*** Dummy for non-French 
(0.0044) (0.0040) (0.0041) (0.0040) (0.0053) (0.0082) (0.0117) (0.0040) 
-0.0277*** -0.0299*** -0.0340*** -0.0335*** -0.0338*** -0.0400*** -0.0403*** -0.0440*** Dummy for single 
(0.0029) (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0025) (0.0032) (0.0050) (0.0070) (0.0025) 
-0.0257*** -0.0237*** -0.0405*** -0.0390*** -0.0534*** -0.0969*** -0.1154*** -0.0543*** Dummy for widowed 
(0.0094) (0.0085) (0.0085) (0.0084) (0.0108) (0.0168) (0.0237) (0.0084) 
-0.0045 -0.0002 0.0054 0.0002 -0.0041 -0.0138* -0.0073 -0.0041 Dummy for divorced 
(0.0044) (0.0040) (0.0040) (0.0039) (0.0051) (0.0079) (0.0111) (0.0039) 
0.0129*** 0.0144*** 0.0169*** 0.0207*** 0.0215*** 0.0211*** 0.0221*** 0.0206*** Number of dependent children 
(0.0011) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0011) (0.0016) (0.0023) (0.0009) 
0.1204*** 0.1550*** 0.2028*** 0.2366*** 0.2787*** 0.3195*** 0.3419*** 0.2500*** Dummy for workplace (1: Paris) 
(0.0025) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0029) (0.0046) (0.0065) (0.0023) 
-0.0032 -0.0051 -0.0069* -0.0186*** -0.0482*** -0.0673*** -0.0992*** -0.0411*** Dummy for type of contract 
(CDD: « contrat à durée déterminée ») (0.0047) (0.0042) (0.0041) (0.0039) (0.0050) (0.0078) (0.0112) (0.0039) 
0.0266*** 0.0289*** 0.0299*** 0.0187*** -0.0138*** -0.0678*** -0.1116*** -0.0011 Log of hours paid work per year 
(0.0018) (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0015) (0.0020) (0.0032) (0.0047) (0.0015) 
Observations 137211 137211 137211 137211 137211 137211 137211 137211
Pseudo R-squared 0.1131 0.1402 0.1823 0.2151 0.2347 0.2509 0.2494 0.3534 
Survey INSEE ECMOSS 1992. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, ** and * mean respectively significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
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Table A 4: Earnings functions, with extended control variables and sectoral dummies 
(Dependent variable: Log hourly earnings)  
Quantile regressions OLS Variables 
0.05 0.10 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.90 0.95 mean 
-0.0831*** -0.0956*** -0.1238*** -0.1527*** -0.2089*** -0.2708*** -0.3041*** -0.1881*** Dummy for female 
(0.0023) (0.0020) (0.0019) (0.0020) (0.0025) (0.0043) (0.0058) (0.0019) 
3.0113*** 2.9348*** 2.7024*** 2.5434*** 2.6610*** 3.0683*** 3.4537*** 2.4341*** Constant 
(0.0169) (0.0150) (0.0151) (0.0164) (0.0205) (0.0354) (0.0467) (0.0155) 
0.0411*** 0.0496*** 0.0725*** 0.0988*** 0.1196*** 0.1314*** 0.1338*** 0.1059*** Years of schooling 
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0008) (0.0014) (0.0017) (0.0006) 
0.0021*** 0.0030*** 0.0071*** 0.0133*** 0.0215*** 0.0304*** 0.0360*** 0.0157*** Years of experience off the current establishment 
(0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0007) (0.0009) (0.0003) 
-0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0002*** -0.0003*** -0.0004*** -0.0005*** -0.0006*** -0.0003*** (Years of experience off the current firm)2 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
0.0159*** 0.0173*** 0.0203*** 0.0230*** 0.0253*** 0.0282*** 0.0309*** 0.0227*** Years of tenure in the current firm 
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0008) (0.0010) (0.0003) 
-0.0002*** -0.0002*** -0.0002*** -0.0002*** -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0002*** -0.0002*** (Years of tenure in the current firm)2 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
-0.1003*** -0.1106*** -0.1380*** -0.1598*** -0.1735*** -0.1701*** -0.1277*** -0.1771*** Dummy for non-French 
(0.0044) (0.0040) (0.0039) (0.0042) (0.0052) (0.0089) (0.0117) (0.0040) 
-0.0265*** -0.0293*** -0.0350*** -0.0330*** -0.0324*** -0.0417*** -0.0417*** -0.0433*** Dummy for single 
(0.0028) (0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0026) (0.0032) (0.0054) (0.0070) (0.0025) 
-0.0275*** -0.0298*** -0.0456*** -0.0413*** -0.0596*** -0.0944*** -0.0957*** -0.0567*** Dummy for widowed 
(0.0093) (0.0083) (0.0082) (0.0086) (0.0106) (0.0179) (0.0233) (0.0083) 
-0.0071 -0.0033 -0.0024 -0.0024 -0.0075 -0.0174** -0.0125 -0.0070* Dummy for divorced 
(0.0044) (0.0039) (0.0038) (0.0040) (0.0049) (0.0084) (0.0110) (0.0039) 
0.0124*** 0.0127*** 0.0144*** 0.0178*** 0.0191*** 0.0183*** 0.0202*** 0.0188*** Number of dependent children 
(0.0011) (0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0011) (0.0018) (0.0023) (0.0009) 
0.1176*** 0.1431*** 0.1895*** 0.2320*** 0.2797*** 0.3148*** 0.3337*** 0.2444*** Dummy for workplace (1: Paris) 
(0.0025) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0024) (0.0029) (0.0050) (0.0065) (0.0023) 
-0.0164*** -0.0119*** -0.0136*** -0.0266*** -0.0523*** -0.0764*** -0.1043*** -0.0467*** Dummy for type of contract 
(CDD: « contrat à durée déterminée ») 
(0.0046) (0.0040) (0.0039) (0.0040) (0.0049) (0.0084) (0.0112) (0.0038) 
0.0267*** 0.0289*** 0.0298*** 0.0177*** -0.0150*** -0.0683*** -0.1097*** -0.0021 Log of hours paid work per year 
(0.0017) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0016) (0.0020) (0.0035) (0.0046) (0.0015) 
Control for sector yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Control for occupation no no no no no no no no 
Observations 137211 137211 137211 137211 137211 137211 137211 137211 
Pseudo R-squared 0.1131 0.1402 0.1823 0.2151 0.2347 0.2509 0.2494 0.3534 
Survey INSEE ECMOSS 1992. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, ** and * mean respectively significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
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Table A 5: Earnings functions, with extended control variables and firms’ factor effects 
(Dependent variable: Log hourly earnings)  
Quantile regressions OLS Variables 
0.05 0.10 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.90 0.95 mean 
-0.0746*** -0.0814*** -0.0969*** -0.1148*** -0.1381*** -0.1690*** -0.1955*** -0.1267*** Dummy for female 
(0.0030) (0.0024) (0.0020) (0.0017) (0.0021) (0.0030) (0.0041) (0.0017) 
3.5225*** 3.5954*** 3.7356*** 4.0149*** 4.4499*** 5.0738*** 5.7606*** 4.0597*** Constant 
(0.0531) (0.0441) (0.0373) (0.0338) (0.0421) (0.0605) (0.0835) (0.0338) 
0.0180*** 0.0191*** 0.0210*** 0.0254*** 0.0289*** 0.0314*** 0.0316*** 0.0283*** Years of schooling 
(0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0010) (0.0013) (0.0005) 
0.0026*** 0.0031*** 0.0047*** 0.0070*** 0.0093*** 0.0107*** 0.0118*** 0.0083*** Years of experience off the current establishment 
(0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0002) 
-0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0002*** -0.0002*** -0.0002*** -0.0002*** (Years of experience off the current firm)2 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
0.0157*** 0.0168*** 0.0184*** 0.0197*** 0.0206*** 0.0213*** 0.0212*** 0.0199*** Years of tenure in the current firm 
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0003) 
-0.0002*** -0.0002*** -0.0003*** -0.0003*** -0.0003*** -0.0003*** -0.0003*** -0.0003*** (Years of tenure in the current firm)2 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
-0.0481*** -0.0480*** -0.0473*** -0.0463*** -0.0366*** -0.0267*** -0.0205*** -0.0481*** Dummy for non-French 
(0.0048) (0.0040) (0.0034) (0.0031) (0.0039) (0.0056) (0.0078) (0.0031) 
-0.0218*** -0.0239*** -0.0228*** -0.0227*** -0.0247*** -0.0237*** -0.0241*** -0.0271*** Dummy for single 
(0.0030) (0.0025) (0.0021) (0.0019) (0.0024) (0.0034) (0.0047) (0.0019) 
-0.0175* -0.0261*** -0.0256*** -0.0295*** -0.0278*** -0.0339*** -0.0364** -0.0303*** Dummy for widowed 
(0.0099) (0.0083) (0.0070) (0.0063) (0.0079) (0.0113) (0.0156) (0.0063) 
-0.0058 -0.0034 0.0003 0.0007 -0.0013 -0.0016 0.0018 -0.0031 Dummy for divorced 
(0.0047) (0.0039) (0.0033) (0.0030) (0.0037) (0.0053) (0.0073) (0.0029) 
0.0109*** 0.0108*** 0.0111*** 0.0120*** 0.0122*** 0.0138*** 0.0116*** 0.0129*** Number of dependent children 
(0.0011) (0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0011) (0.0016) (0.0007) 
0.0906*** 0.1029*** 0.1216*** 0.1436*** 0.1662*** 0.1674*** 0.1728*** 0.1453*** Dummy for workplace (1: Paris) 
(0.0029) (0.0024) (0.0020) (0.0018) (0.0022) (0.0031) (0.0043) (0.0018) 
-0.0386*** -0.0330*** -0.0225*** -0.0203*** -0.0379*** -0.0587*** -0.0739*** -0.0422*** Dummy for type of contract  
(CDD: « contrat à durée déterminée ») (0.0049) (0.0040) (0.0033) (0.0030) (0.0037) (0.0055) (0.0078) (0.0029) 
Log of hours paid work per year 0.0138*** 0.0105*** 0.0037*** -0.0097*** -0.0386*** -0.0925*** -0.1419*** -0.0302*** 
 (0.0020) (0.0016) (0.0013) (0.0012) (0.0015) (0.0023) (0.0032) (0.0012) 
Control for sector yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Control for occupation yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Firm factor effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 137211 137211 137211 137211 137211 137211 137211 137211 
Pseudo R-squared 0.1131 0.1402 0.1823 0.2151 0.2347 0.2509 0.2494 0.3534 
Survey INSEE ECMOSS 1992. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, ** and * mean respectively significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
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Table A 6: Earnings functions, with extended control variables and sectoral and occupational effects 
(Dependent variable: Log hourly earnings) 
 
Quantile regressions OLS Variables 
0.05 0.10 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.90 0.95 mean 
-0.0921*** -0.1053*** -0.1288*** -0.1570*** -0.2018*** -0.2499*** -0.2757*** -0.1825*** Dummy for female 
(0.0024) (0.0020) (0.0018) (0.0019) (0.0026) (0.0038) (0.0052) (0.0018) 
2.8992*** 2.8164*** 2.6677*** 2.5772*** 2.6610*** 3.0234*** 3.3881*** 2.6491*** Constant 
(0.0169) (0.0143) (0.0133) (0.0139) (0.0204) (0.0298) (0.0413) (0.0138) 
0.0390*** 0.0480*** 0.0682*** 0.0915*** 0.1130*** 0.1273*** 0.1319*** 0.0987*** Years of schooling 
(0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0009) (0.0013) (0.0018) (0.0006) 
0.0028*** 0.0042*** 0.0072*** 0.0128*** 0.0208*** 0.0306*** 0.0352*** 0.0153*** Years of experience off the current establishment 
(0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0009) (0.0003) 
-0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0002*** -0.0003*** -0.0004*** -0.0005*** -0.0005*** -0.0003*** (Years of experience off the current firm)2 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
0.0161*** 0.0180*** 0.0209*** 0.0234*** 0.0261*** 0.0295*** 0.0307*** 0.0234*** Years of tenure in the current firm 
(0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0010) (0.0004) 
-0.0002*** -0.0002*** -0.0002*** -0.0002*** -0.0002*** -0.0002*** -0.0002*** -0.0002*** (Years of tenure in the current firm)2 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
-0.1006*** -0.1181*** -0.1321*** -0.1628*** -0.1796*** -0.1888*** -0.1487*** -0.1792*** Dummy for non-French 
(0.0049) (0.0042) (0.0039) (0.0040) (0.0058) (0.0085) (0.0116) (0.0040) 
-0.0329*** -0.0322*** -0.0361*** -0.0358*** -0.0366*** -0.0395*** -0.0392*** -0.0461*** Dummy for single 
(0.0032) (0.0027) (0.0024) (0.0025) (0.0036) (0.0051) (0.0069) (0.0025) 
-0.0343*** -0.0303*** -0.0490*** -0.0403*** -0.0562*** -0.1047*** -0.1318*** -0.0547*** Dummy for widowed 
(0.0105) (0.0089) (0.0081) (0.0083) (0.0119) (0.0172) (0.0235) (0.0083) 
-0.0054 -0.0068 0.0023 -0.0033 -0.0033 -0.0250*** -0.0184* -0.0078** Dummy for divorced 
(0.0049) (0.0042) (0.0038) (0.0039) (0.0056) (0.0080) (0.0110) (0.0039) 
0.0113*** 0.0127*** 0.0140*** 0.0181*** 0.0188*** 0.0184*** 0.0214*** 0.0180*** Number of dependent children 
(0.0012) (0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0012) (0.0017) (0.0023) (0.0009) 
0.1199*** 0.1452*** 0.1787*** 0.2119*** 0.2499*** 0.2893*** 0.3159*** 0.2260*** Dummy for workplace (1: Paris) 
(0.0029) (0.0025) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0033) (0.0048) (0.0066) (0.0023) 
-0.0262*** -0.0268*** -0.0213*** -0.0324*** -0.0472*** -0.0719*** -0.1003*** -0.0481*** Dummy for type of contract  
(CDD: « contrat à durée déterminée ») (0.0051) (0.0043) (0.0039) (0.0039) (0.0055) (0.0080) (0.0111) (0.0038) 
Log of hours paid work per year 0.0238*** 0.0258*** 0.0240*** 0.0119*** -0.0174*** -0.0709*** -0.1139*** -0.0060*** 
 (0.0020) (0.0016) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0022) (0.0033) (0.0046) (0.0015) 
Control for sector no no no no no no no no 
Control for occupation no no no no no no no no 
Firm factor effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 137211 137211 137211 137211 137211 137211 137211 137211 
Pseudo R-squared 0.1131 0.1402 0.1823 0.2151 0.2347 0.2509 0.2494 0.3534 
Survey INSEE ECMOSS 1992. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, ** and * mean respectively significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
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Table A 7: Earnings functions, with extended control variable, firms’ factor effects and occupational effects 
(Dependent variable: Log hourly earnings)  
Quantile regressions OLS Variables 
0.05 0.10 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.90 0.95 mean 
-0.0848*** -0.0904*** -0.1017*** -0.1219*** -0.1447*** -0.1764*** -0.2008*** -0.1326*** Dummy for female 
(0.0030) (0.0023) (0.0019) (0.0017) (0.0021) (0.0028) (0.0039) (0.0017) 
3.4573*** 3.5584*** 3.7292*** 4.0518*** 4.4540*** 5.1596*** 5.6814*** 4.1618*** Constant 
(0.0521) (0.0404) (0.0356) (0.0337) (0.0413) (0.0573) (0.0793) (0.0335) 
0.0154*** 0.0164*** 0.0181*** 0.0220*** 0.0252*** 0.0281*** 0.0293*** 0.0250*** Years of schooling 
(0.0008) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0009) (0.0013) (0.0005) 
0.0023*** 0.0033*** 0.0049*** 0.0068*** 0.0089*** 0.0108*** 0.0123*** 0.0079*** Years of experience off the current establishment 
(0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0002) 
-0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0002*** -0.0002*** -0.0002*** -0.0002*** (Years of experience off the current firm)2 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
0.0159*** 0.0172*** 0.0185*** 0.0201*** 0.0207*** 0.0213*** 0.0219*** 0.0203*** Years of tenure in the current firm 
(0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0003) 
-0.0002*** -0.0002*** -0.0002*** -0.0003*** -0.0003*** -0.0003*** -0.0003*** -0.0003*** (Years of tenure in the current firm)2 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
-0.0509*** -0.0499*** -0.0485*** -0.0462*** -0.0413*** -0.0326*** -0.0327*** -0.0505*** Dummy for non-French 
(0.0048) (0.0037) (0.0033) (0.0031) (0.0039) (0.0054) (0.0075) (0.0031) 
-0.0260*** -0.0237*** -0.0248*** -0.0245*** -0.0267*** -0.0270*** -0.0248*** -0.0292*** Dummy for single 
(0.0030) (0.0023) (0.0020) (0.0019) (0.0024) (0.0033) (0.0046) (0.0019) 
-0.0211** -0.0211*** -0.0249*** -0.0237*** -0.0200** -0.0331*** -0.0312** -0.0271*** Dummy for widowed 
(0.0098) (0.0076) (0.0067) (0.0064) (0.0079) (0.0109) (0.0150) (0.0063) 
-0.0062 -0.0056 0.0001 -0.0004 0.0012 -0.0024 -0.0006 -0.0033 Dummy for divorced 
(0.0046) (0.0036) (0.0032) (0.0030) (0.0037) (0.0051) (0.0070) (0.0030) 
0.0110*** 0.0107*** 0.0110*** 0.0119*** 0.0123*** 0.0112*** 0.0101*** 0.0129*** Number of dependent children 
(0.0011) (0.0009) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0011) (0.0015) (0.0007) 
0.0902*** 0.0979*** 0.1120*** 0.1319*** 0.1453*** 0.1454*** 0.1488*** 0.1311*** Dummy for workplace (1: Paris) 
(0.0029) (0.0022) (0.0020) (0.0018) (0.0022) (0.0031) (0.0043) (0.0018) 
-0.0414*** -0.0361*** -0.0249*** -0.0229*** -0.0405*** -0.0624*** -0.0739*** -0.0446*** Dummy for type of contract  
(CDD: « contrat à durée déterminée ») (0.0049) (0.0037) (0.0032) (0.0030) (0.0037) (0.0053) (0.0075) (0.0029) 
Log of hours paid work per year 0.0131*** 0.0100*** 0.0027** -0.0109*** -0.0405*** -0.0946*** -0.1431*** -0.0312*** 
 (0.0020) (0.0015) (0.0013) (0.0012) (0.0015) (0.0022) (0.0031) (0.0012) 
Control for sector no no no no no no no no 
Control for occupation yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Firm factor effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 137211 137211 137211 137211 137211 137211 137211 137211 
Pseudo R-squared 0.1131 0.1402 0.1823 0.2151 0.2347 0.2509 0.2494 0.3534 
Survey INSEE ECMOSS 1992. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, ** and * mean respectively significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
